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Article 6

TAXATION-NEITHER AN INTEREST-FREE BORROWER NOR A
LENDER BE:
STATES

INTEREST-FREE LOANS UNDER HARDEE V

UNITED

The interest-free use of corporate funds by shareholders and employees is a popular business practice. The shareholder or employee
receives funds from the corporation without a corresponding obligation to reimburse the corporation for the money's decreased time
value utility.' The corporation often uses this method to increase
2
compensation to a key employee or shareholder.
Recently, in Hardee v. United States,3 the United States Court of
Claims rejected long-standing precedent established in the Tax
Court 4 by deciding that interest-free loans result in income to the
recipient. This piece analyzes the Hardee decision and discusses the
use of interest-free loans in general. Part I provides a historical background of interest-free loan decisions. Parts II and III discuss and
analyze the Hardee decision and explain why the Court of Claims
reached the correct result. Part IV explains the present effect and
possible ramifications of the Hardee decision.
I.

Historical Background

The Tax Court of the United States first considered whether to
impute income to a shareholder receiving an interest-free loan in
Dean v. Commissioner.5 In Dean, the Commissioner argued that the
shareholder had realized 6 a benefit, and should have therefore recog1 See note 7 infa and accompanying text.
2 Phillips, Current Tax Treatment of Interest-Free Loans, Wis. B. J., March 1982, at 13.
3 [U.S. Tax Cases] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCi) 9459 (Ct. Cl. July 6, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hardee].
4 Trowbhridge v. Commissioner, 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,190; Beaton v. Commissioner,
40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1324 (1980), afd, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Baker v. Commissioner, 75
T.C. 166 (1980); Martin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CC) 531 (1979), afd, 649 F.2d 1133
(5th Cir. 1981); Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), a 'dsub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), a fd sub
nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 931 (1979), a.ffd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Suttle v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CC) 1638 (1978), aj'd, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083
(1961).
5 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). In Dean, the taxpayers received interest-free loans exceeding $2
million from their controlled corporation. Id. at 1083.
6 Gains and losses that are realized must be distinguished from gains and losses that are
recognized. For example, a taxpayer realizes a gain from a transaction when the transaction
increases the value of the taxpayer's asset. Whether or not this gain is recognized depends on
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nized an amount of income equal to the interest obligation that the
shareholder would have incurred in the marketplace. 7 In so arguing,
the Commissioner relied on a series of cases holding that the rent-free
use of corporate property results in realized income. 8 The Commissioner argued that the benefit a shareholder obtains from an interestfree loan should similarly result in taxable income.9
The Tax Court, in rejecting the Commissioner's contention, distinguished the rent-free use of corporate property from the receipt of
interest-free loans.' 0 The Dean court reasoned that, had the rent-free
users of corporate property procured the same benefit by expending
money, the expenditures would not have been deductible.I' On the
its treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. Unless the Code specifically exempts the
gain from taxation, the taxpayer must recognize the gain and include it in his gross income.
If the gain is exempted under the Code, then, although the gain is realized by the taxpayer,
the Internal Revenue Service will not recognize the gain as taxable income. The same distinction applies to transactions resulting in taxpayer losses.
7 35 T.C. at 1087. The interest obligation which the taxpayer would incur would be
based on the prevailing prime interest rate. The Commissioner's argument has merit because
of the time value utility of money. For example, assume that a shareholder borrows $10,000
interest-free from his corporation in 1981. If the shareholder repays the $10,000 in 1982, the
corporation realizes an economic loss which is not deductible under the Internal Revenue
Code, i.e., the decreased value of $10,000 over a one year period. The shareholder realizes a
corresponding economic gain equal to the value of the use of $10,000 for one year. This gain
is measured by the interest that the taxpayer would have paid to borrow the $10,000 in the
marketplace. The Commissioner argued that, since the shareholder realized an economic
gain, this gain should be recognized and taxed as gross income. Id.
8 Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951) (rent-free use of corporation's
house); Chester Distrib. Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1950) (personal entertainment expenses paid by corporation); Silverman v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1061 (1957), afJd,
253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958)(wife's travel expenses paid by corporation); Greenspon v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 138 (1954), revd on other grounds, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) (farm expenses paid by corporation); Paulina du Pont Dean v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 256 (1947) (rentfree use of corporation's house); Chandler v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1940), afd, 119
F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941) (rent-free use of corporation's apartment and lodge); Reynard Corp. v.
Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934) (rent-free use of corporation's house); Frueauff v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934) (rent-free use of corporation's apartment).
9 35 T.C. at 1087. The Commissioner's argument was based on the distinction between
realized and recognized gross income. See note 6 supra. The argument for recognizing the
benefit as taxable income is supported by § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, which states
that "gross income is income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61 (1976). The rentfree use of corporate property often results in income to the recipient. See text accompanying
note 8 supra.
The interest-free use of corporate funds results in the same economic benefit as the rentfree use of corporate property. In each instance, the employee or shareholder obtains the free
use of a corporate asset. Therefore, in both cases the free use should result in the same tax
consequences-the recognition of taxable income.
10 The court stated that rent-free use of corporate property cases "bear a superficial resemblance" to interest-free loan cases, but that the two were not identical. 35 T.C. at 1090.
11 Id. The court's statement was based on § 262 of the Internal Revenue Code. § 262
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other hand, had the taxpayers in Dean borrowed the funds on an
interest-bearing basis, the resulting interest payments would have
been deductible.' 2 Thus, the Tax Court concluded that an interest3
free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower.'
The Tax Court did not reexamine its reasoning in Dean until
1979, in Greenspun v. Commissioner.'4 There, the court reached the
Dean result, but through a different analysis. The Greenspun court
agreed with the Commissioner's contention that the interest-free borrower received an economic benefit.' 5 The court noted that, under
section 163(a),' 6 the interest-free borrower would not have been entitled to an interest deduction. However, the court ruled that basing
this decision on the question of deductibility failed to recognize the
economic realities of the transaction. 7 The court stated that an interest-free loan does not differ from a two-step transaction in which a
corporation pays dividends or compensation to the borrower to offset
the interest it charges on an interest-bearing loan.' 8 The court reaspecifically disallows, except as otherwise provided, any deduction "for personal, living, or
family expenses." I.R.C. § 262 (1976).
12 35 T.C. at 1090. § 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows as a deduction "all
interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." I.R.C. § 163 (1976).
13 35 T.C. at 1090. In reaching this conclusion, the court apparently relied on the
"wash" theory. Under the wash theory, the court reasoned that, had the shareholder recognized the economic benefit resulting from the use of corporate funds as gross income, a
§ 163(a) interest deduction (see note 16 infra) would offset this income, resulting in a "wash"
transaction. This wash concept was rejected by Judge Wiese in Hardee. See notes 33-37 in/ra
and accompanying text.
14 72 T.C. 931 (1979), aj'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982). In Greenspun, Howard Hughes
had tried to make substantial investments in the Las Vegas area. Greenspun was the owner
of the Las Vegas Sun, a daily newspaper that Hughes had attempted to acquire. After
Greenspun informed Hughes that he would not sell the Sun, Hughes set out to control the
Sun indirectly by offering a $4 million interest-free loan to Greenspun. Concerned that the
Internal Revenue Service might question the transaction, the parties later agreed on a 3%
interest rate per annum for an eight-year term. The minimum rate at which Greenspun
could have borrowed that amount in the marketplace was 6%. Id. at 931-32.
15 Id. at 947.
16 I.R.C. § 163 (1976). See note 12 supra.
17 72 T.C. at 951. The economic realities mentioned by the court relate to the idea of an
interest-free loan coupled with increased compensation. See note 18 infra. Assume that
Hughes had granted a loan at 6% interest to Greenspun and paid Greenspun cash equal to
3% of the charged interest, which Greenspun repaid to Hughes in partial satisfaction of the
6% interest. In this case, Greenspun would receive compensation and an offsetting interest
deduction. The mere elimination of Hughes' formally paying Greenspun cash equal to 3%
interest (which is repaid to Hughes) should not change the result.
18 Id. at 948. It is worthwhile to compare the two transactions. In an interest-free loan,
the shareholder or employee receives money from the corporation without any obligation to
pay interest. Thus, the recipient has received an asset without incurring a liability. He has
thus benefitted in this situation. In the situation where compensation is increased to the
extent of the interest to be repaid, the shareholder or employee receives the same benefit. The
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soned that since the two-step transaction would result in a "wash", 19
the interest-free loan should also cause no taxable gain to the
20
borrower.
Although Dean has not yet been overruled, courts have displayed growing disfavor with the holding. The Tax Court showed
disfavor with Dean in Zager v. Commissioner,2 ' where it stated that Dean
may have been overbroad.2 2 Two years later, in Beaton v. Commissioner,23 the Tax Court -hesitantly followed Dean, noting that a depar-

ture from Dean would have resulted in uncertainty and a possible
24
uneven application of the tax law.

II.

Hardee v. United States: The Court's Reasoning

For over twenty years, the Commissioner continued to fight a
losing battle to tax interest-free loans. Finally, in Hardee v. United
States25 the Court of Claims departed from the precedent the Tax
Court had established and adopted the Commissioner's viewpoint.
In Hardee, the court held that a corporation's interest-free loan to a
26
shareholder resulted in taxable income to the borrower.
The Court of Claims in Hardee, using a two-pronged approach,
rejected the Tax Court's reasoning in Dean.27 The court first focused
on the economic benefit attributable to the loan. The court noted
that, under the principle established in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co. ,28 the definition of gross income in section 6129 should be conrecipient receives the same asset (the loan). The recipient incurs a liability (interest expense)
but, due to the increased compensation, the corporation actually reimburses him for payment
of this liability. Since the additional amount of compensation will equal the expense incurred, the interest-bearing loan recipient does not "pay" for the use of these funds. He is
placed in the same position, and receives the same benefit as an interest-free borrower.
19 See note 13 supra.
20 72 T.C. at 948.
21 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), afd sub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.
1981).
22 Id. at 1012.
23 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1324 (1980), aJ'd, 664 F.2d 315 (lst Cir. 1981).
24 664 F.2d at 317.
25 Hardee, supra note 3.
26 Id. at 84,659. Hardee, the majority stockholder and president of a closely held corporation, had borrowed money from the corporation on an account for over twenty years. In
exchange for the loans, Hardee gave the corporation noninterest-bearing notes. The Commissioner claimed that Hardee had realized an economic benefit, measured by the amount of
interest Hardee would have been required to pay in an arm's-length loan transaction.
Hardee's oustanding loan balances were $503,000 in 1973 and $474,000 in 1974.
27 Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). See notes 4-12 supra and accompanying
text.
28 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
29 See note 9 supra.
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strued broadly to effect Congress's intention to "tax all gains except
those specifically exempted. 3 0° The Hardee court compared using
corporate funds to using other corporate assets and found that the
user has an economic benefit in both situations. 3 1 The shareholder or
32
employee must recognize this economic benefit as gross income.
Second, the Court of Claims further vitiated Dean by refusing
Hardee a corresponding interest deduction.3 3 In Dean, the Tax
Court had reasoned that a section 163(a) 34 interest deduction would
offset the economic benefit resulting from the use of corporate
funds.3 5 In Hardee, Judge Wiese rejected this analysis and held that
no statutory authority for an interest deduction existed 36 because sec37
tion 163(a) permits a deduction only for interest paid or accrued.
Furthermore, the court in Hardee rejected the Greenspun38 analysis, which had attempted to give equal tax treatment to two supposedly similar economic situations.3 9 eenspun had equated the tax
treatment of an interest-free loan with that of an interest-bearing
loan coupled with increased compensation. 40 The Hardee court focused only on interest-free loans, and did not equate interest-free
loans with interest-bearing loans coupled with increased compensation.4 1 The court added that one must focus on what actually occurred and not on what might have happened.42 For this reason, the
court rejected Greenspun's "economic equivalent" analysis.
The essence of the Court of Claims's decision in Hardee is that an
43
interest-free loan from a corporation to its shareholder or employee
gives rise to income and income only. No interest deduction is al30 348 U.S. at 430.
31 Hardee, supra note 3.
32 Id. at 84,659.
33 Id.
34 See note 15 supra.
35 35 T.C. at 1090. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
36 The Hardee court cited Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating Co., 417 U.S.
134 (1974), which held that deductions were a matter of legislative grace and did not turn
upon equitable considerations, such as a demonstration of effective economic and practical
equivalence. Id at 148-49.
37 Hardee, supra note 3, at 84,659. See note 16 supra.
38 72 T.C. 931.
39 See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
40 72 T.C. at 931, 943. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
41 Hardee, sufira note 3, at 84,659.
42 Id. at 84,659.
43 Hardee was a majority shareholder and president ofthis closely-held corporation. The
difference between an employee and shareholder is crucial when analyzing the tax consequences to the corporate lender. In general, the Commissioner's policy in situations where a

THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[December 1982]

lowed under section 163(a) because the shareholder borrows without
cost; 44 no interest was paid or accrued.
III.

Analysis of Hardee

The Hardee decision is technically sound. It effects the congressional purpose of Internal Revenue Code section 61, which defines
gross income,4 5 and it literally applies section 163(a) regarding interest deductions. 46 However, the Commissioner has not been fighting
for over 20 years simply to see the Internal Revenue Code literally
applied. One must examine the tax consequences to both the borrower and the lender to understand the Commissioner's relentless ef47
fort to tax interest-free loans.
A.

Tax Consequences to the Borrower (Employee or Shareholder)

The tax consequences to the borrower of receiving an interestfree loan have been the subject of Dean and its progeny, and were the
subject of Hardee. The Dean court compared the interest-free borrower to the marketplace borrower. 48 The Greenspun court, on the
other hand, equated an interest-free loan with a supposed two-step
transaction where the borrower receives an interest-bearing arm'slength loan with a corresponding increase in dividends or compensation to offset this charge. 49 In either case, however, the underlying
rationale is the same: any imputed income would be offset by an
equivalent imputed interest deduction under Internal Revenue Code
section 163(a), thus resulting in a wash transaction. 50
The Hardee court quickly dispensed with this rationale by literally interpreting section 163(a) to provide a deduction only for interest "paid or accrued." 5 1 Two significant flaws in the Dean and
taxpayer is both an employee and a shareholder is to treat the taxpayer as a shareholder. See
text accompanying notes 67-68 infra.
44 Hardee, supra note 3, at 84,659. The court reasoned that there are no "up-front" borrowing costs. For the interest-free borrower, the borrowing is truly "free". Id.
45 See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
46 See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
47 Neither Dean, Greenspun, nor Hardee have focused on the tax ramifications to the corporate lender when the corporation gives an interest-free loan. The best method of dealing with
these loans is to require both the individual and the corporation to appear in court. This way
the court can determine the tax ramifications to each party by examining both sides of the
transaction.
48 35 T.C. at 1090. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
49 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
50 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
51 See note 16 supra.
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Greenspun reasoning support this literal interpretation of section
163(a). These flaws make it difficult to justify allowance of imputed
interest deductions.
First, instances exist where interest expense may not be deductible under section 163(a). These instances involve cases where: (1) an
interest deduction for investment indebtedness is limited by section
163(d),52 (2) an interest deduction for debt incurred to purchase or
carry tax-exempt securities is prohibited by section 265, 5s or (3) interest is not deductible because the taxpayer has not itemized his deductions.54 Thus, one cannot assume that an interest deduction would
be allowed in all situations.
Judge Goldberg offered an alternative to this broad assumption
of deductibility in his dissent in Martin v. Commissioner.55 Judge
Goldberg suggested that the proper way to tax an interest-free loan is
to require the borrower to include the economic benefit of the interest-free loan in his gross income. Judge Goldberg would then allow
the loan recipient an interest deduction in those cases where the interest would have been deductible if paid.56 Although Judge
Goldberg's theory offers a viable solution in dealing with the DeanGreenspun rationale's first flaw, it offers no help in dealing with the
second.
The second flaw in the treatment of interest-free loans under the
Dean-Greenspun rationale is attributable to the Greenspun court equating two different transactions. The Tax Court in Greenspun held that
an interest-free loan was economically equivalent to a two-step
arm's-length transaction where the borrower is required to pay interest, but receives a corresponding increase in compensation or dividends to cover the interest charge. 57 The Greenspun court reasoned
that, because the interest-free loan and the two-step transaction were
economically equivalent, and since the two-step transaction would
52 I.R.C. § 163(d) (1976) provides generally that a taxpayer other than a corporation is
limited to an investment interest deduction of $10,000 ($5000 when married filing separately), plus the amount of net investment income plus the amount by which certain allowable deductions exceed the rental income produced by such property for the taxable year.
53 I.R.C. § 265 (1976) provides that no expenses or interest charges relating to the carrying of obligations producing tax-exempt income are deductible.
54 I.R.C. § 161 (1976). In computing taxable income, items specified in Code sections
161 to 222 are allowed as itemized deductions.
55 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 531 (1979), aft'd, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
56 649 F.2d at 1142. Judge Goldberg's alternative suffers from the same drawbacks as do
those of Dean and Creenspun. Judge Goldberg is willing to create an exception to § 163(a).
Unfortunately, courts create difficulties when they delve into fictions and should therefore
apply the Code to the actual facts. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
57 See text accompanying notes 18 and 49 supra.
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result in a wash,5 8 the interest-free loan should result in no taxable

gain to the borrower.5 9 This reasoning is flawed, however, because
the purportedly equivalent two-step transaction does not always re60
sult in a wash.
In Hardee, the Court of Claims put the borrower in a worse posi-

tion than he would have been in under Dean or Greenspun6 1 by including the economic benefit conferred upon the interest-free borrower in

his gross income while disallowing any imputed interest deduction.
Thus, with respect to the borrower, the Hardee decision discourages the
use of interest-free loans, and encourages structuring corporate loans

at arm's-length with corresponding increases in dividends or compensation to the borrower. 6 2 This two-step transaction would cause tax
63
treatment similar to the Dean treatment of interest-free loans,
would eliminate the need to impute an interest deduction, and would

accurately reflect gross income.
B.

Tax Consequences to the Lender (Corporation)

Although Dean, Greenspun, and Hardee have focused on the tax
consequences to the borrower, the tax consequences to the corporate
58 See notes 13 and 50 supra and accompanying text.
59 72 T.C. at 932.
60 For example, a distortion of adjusted gross income may occur when an interest-free
loan is analyzed under the Dean-Greenspun wash concept rather than under the two-step transaction concept. In the two-step transaction, although the taxpayer includes in gross income
the same amount that he is entitled to deduct as interest expense, his adjusted gross income is
higher than it would be under the Dean-Greenspun analysis. This is so because, under the DeanGreenspun analysis, no amount is included in gross income. This distortion, or lowering of
adjusted gross income under Dean-Greenspun, could result in higher deductions for charitable
contributions and medical expenses, which are limited by the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 170(b), 213(a)-(b) (1976).
61 Even under Hardee, the interest-free borrower is in a better tax position than the marketplace borrower. For example, an employee in the 40% tax bracket who borrows $1000
interest-free when the prevailing prime interest rate is 10% recognizes $100 as taxable income.
The taxpayer's net borrowing cost is $40, the increase in his tax liablility. In contrast, an
employee who borrows $1000 in the marketplace at the same 10% interest rate pays the same
$100 interest expense and receives a $100 interest deduction, which saves him $40 if he is in
the 40% tax bracket, assuming that the taxpayer itemizes and his itemized deductions exceed
the zero bracket amount. His net borrowing cost would therefore be $60, the $100 cash outlay less the $40 tax savings. Thus, the interest-free borrower under the Hardee approach still
receives more favorable tax treatment than the marketplace borrower. Only a taxpayer who
is below the 50% tax bracket will benefit from the Hardee tax treatment. Once the taxpayer
reaches the 50% tax bracket, he loses this favorable tax treatment.
62 This conclusion assumes that the shareholder or employee wishes to avoid paying
more taxes as a result of having to include the value of the interest-free loan in gross income.
63 See notes 18 and 49 supra and accompanying text.
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lender must also be examined to explain the Commissioner's persistent attack upon interest-free loans.
Under the Dean analysis, when gross income and a corresponding interest deduction are imputed to an employee-borrower, interest
income should logically be imputed to the corporation. However,
courts using reasoning similar to Dean have decided that interest-free
64
loans result in no taxable income to the corporate lender.
Similarly, using a Greenspun analysis, the interest-free loan
should result in the same tax liability as the purportedly equivalent
two-step transaction. 6 5 But whether these two transactions yield the
same tax liability under pre-Hardee case law depends upon whether
the borrower is an employee or a shareholder.
If a corporation lends money to an employee, the interest-free loan
yields the same tax consequences as the two-step transaction approach. Under the Dean-Greenspun rationale and pre-Hardee case law,
the corporation receives no income and incurs no tax liability if the
transaction is structured as an interest-free loan. With the two-step
transaction, the interest income that the corporation receives is offset
by a corresponding compensation or wage deduction. 66 Thus, the
corporation-to-employee loan results in the same corporate tax consequences under either analysis.
The two approaches differ, however, when the borrower is classified as a shareholder. Under the Dean-Greenspun rationale and preHardee case law, the corporation incurs no tax liability if the loan is
structured as an interest-free loan. However, in a two-step transaction, the corporation's income is increased by the amount of interest
received from the borrower, but no corresponding deduction is allowed since the corporation is deemed to have paid a nondeductible
dividend. 67 Thus, a corporation using a two-step transaction will be
taxed on the interest payments it receives, while a corporation using
an interest-free loan escapes taxation on the loan repayment. Nevertheless, if the Hardee decision actually discourages the use of interestfree loans and encourages the use of two-transaction loans, the practi68
cal effect of these differing tax results will be minimized.
64 See Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 416 (1960).
65 See note 18 supra.
66 I.R.C. § 162 (1976).
67 Id.
68 These tax differences will be eliminated only if one assumes that interest-free loans will
no longer be used. All loans would be structured instead at arm's-length in order to minimize
taxes.
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C. Abuses of Interest-Free Loans Through the ProfessionalCorporation
A secondary purpose of the Commissioner's attack upon interest-free loans may be to solidify the separation between a professional
and his professional corporation. 69 The interest-free loan is an attractive tax deferral and tax savings device 7o among these corporations.
Under the Dean-Greenspun rule, the professional may obtain the use of
money through an interest-free loan, rather than as a taxable
71
salary.
Thus, the Hardee decision may be an attempt to discourage this
type of situation. The effectiveness and prevalence of interest-free
loans for tax avoidance in a professional corporation setting sharply
demonstrates why Dean and Greenspun should be questioned and ultimately overruled.
IV. Conclusion
The Hardee decision was originally appealed to the entire Court
of Claims. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
now has jurisdiction over the appeal under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.72 The decisions of this new court do not bind
the Tax Court. 73 Hardee may not significantly affect the current status of interest-free loans because this decision's adverse consequences
can be easily avoided. The taxpayer can simply refuse to pay the
deficiency and argue his case in the Tax Court, where twenty years of
74
favorable precedent will support him.

69 Professional corporations are governed by state statutes. In states with professional
corporation statutes, designated professionals are allowed to form corporations or associations. These statues allow professionals to enjoy many of the advantages of corporate existence while retaining personal liability for their acts and the professional acts performed under
their supervision. Seegenerally HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 104-05 (2d
ed. 1970).
70 See note 71 infra.
71 For example, assume that a professional incorporated as a professional corporation
earns (net of all expenses) $100,000 in a given year. Normally, the $100,000 will be paid as a
salary to the professional, who will be taxed at individual rates, and the $100,000 will be
deducted as salary expense by the corporation. Thus, the corporation will incur no tax liability for the $100,000 paid as salary. The professional would be taxed at a maximum individual rate of 50% on this amount. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of August 13, 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-34, 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (95 Stat.) 172. However, theprofessional may
borrow the $100,000 interest-free from the corporation, thereby enjoying the use of the money
and paying no taxes under the Dean rationale. The income would be held at the corporate
level, where it would be taxed at lower graduated rates up to 46%. See I.R.C. § 11 (1976).
72 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 1296, 96 Stat. 25
(1982).
73 Id.
74 See note 3 supra.
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439

Nevertheless, taxpayers must be aware that interest-free loans
remain a risky proposition, even in the Tax Court, as evidenced by
the Commissioner's relentless attack upon interest-free loans. Hardee
should be affirmed on appeal, giving the Commissioner a well-reasoned decision upon which to base his attack. Although Hardee may
not presently bind the Tax Court, it presents a sound approach, and
may signify an important shift in the law concerning interest-free
loans.
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